We propose a model to design network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or players wants to establish connectivity with the root. The social optimum is the well-studied Minimum Steiner Tree problem. We assume that the designer has full knowledge of the underlying metric, (given by the graph G and the shortest path metric induced by the costs c e ), but does not know which subset of players will appear. Her goal is to choose a single, universal cost-sharing protocol that has low Price of Anarchy (PoA) for all possible requested subsets of players. The main question we address is: to what extent can prior knowledge of the underlying metric help in the design?
Introduction
Network Cost-Sharing Games. We study a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph G = (V, E) with a nonnegative cost c e on each edge e ∈ E. A set of k terminal vertices or players s 1 , . . . , s k want to establish connectivity with the root t. Each player selects a path P i and the solution is the graph H = ∪ i P i . The global objective is to minimize the cost e∈H c e of this graph, that is the well-studied Minimum Steiner Tree problem.
The cost of an edge may represent infrastructure cost in establishing connectivity or the renting expense, and needs to be covered by the players that use that edge in the solution. There are several ways to split the edge costs among the users and this is dictated by a cost-sharing protocol. Naturally, it is in the players best interest to choose paths that charge them with small cost, and therefore the solution will be a Nash equilibrium (NE). Algorithmic Game Theory provides tools to analyze the quality of the equilibrium solutions; this can be measured with the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [37] (or Price of Stability (PoS) [5] ) that compares the worst-case (or the best-case) cost in a Nash equilibrium with the cost of the minimum Steiner tree. This is a fundamental network design game that was originated by Anshelevich et al. [5] and has been extensively studied since. [5] studied the Shapley cost-sharing protocol, where the cost of each edge is equally split among its users. They showed that the quality of equilibria can be really poor 1 .
Cost-Sharing Protocol Design. Different cost-sharing protocols result in different quality of equilibria. In this work, we are interested in the design of protocols that induce good equilibrium solutions in the worst-case, therefore we focus on protocols that guarantee low PoA. Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [20] were the first to address design questions for network cost-sharing games. They gave a characterization of protocols that satisfy some natural axioms and they thoroughly studied their PoA for the following two classes of protocols, that use different informational assumptions from the perspective of the designer.
Non-uniform protocols. The designer has full knowledge of the instance, that is, she knows both the network topology given by G and the costs c e , and in addition the set of players' requests s 1 , . . . , s k . They showed that a simple priority protocol has a constant PoA; the Nash equilibria induced by the protocol simulate Prim's algorithm for the Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) problem, and therefore achieve constant approximation.
Uniform protocols. The designer has to decide how to split the edge cost among the users without knowledge of the underlying graph. They showed that the PoA is Θ(log k); the upper bound comes from the analysis of the Greedy Algorithm for the Online Steiner Tree problem (OSTP).
Cost-Sharing Design with Incomplete Information. Arguably, there are situations where the former assumption is too optimistic while the latter is too pessimistic. We propose a model that lies in the middle-ground, as a framework to design network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria, when the designer has incomplete information.
We assume that the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric, (given by the graph G and the shortest path metric induced by the costs c e ), but does not know which subset of players will appear. The goal of the designer is to process the graph and choose a single, universal costsharing protocol that has low PoA against all possible requested subsets of players. We make no distributional assumption about arrivals of players, and take the worst-case approach used in (a) (b) (c) Figure 1 : In (a) and (b) we assume two orders on the vertices, denoted by qi or pi. The q-order is adversarially chosen and simulates the adversary for the OSTP [33] , that results to high PoA of Ω(log k). The p-order results to constant PoA. (c) shows an example where both the best ordered protocol and the Shapley protocol have PoA ≥ 5/4, whereas there is an intermediate protocol with PoA 1. In edges with no written cost, we consider the unit cost; we take ε > 0 arbitrarily small.
Competitive Analysis. Once the designer selects the protocol, then an adversary will choose the subset of requested players and their positions in the graph (the s i 's), in a way that maximizes the PoA of the induced game.
Example 1. (Ordered protocols). A special class with interesting properties is that of ordered protocols. The designer decides a total order of the users, and when a subset of players uses some edge, the full cost is covered by the player who is first in the order. Any Nash equilibria of the induced game correspond to the solution produced by the Greedy Algorithm for the MST: after ordering the players, each one is connected with the existing component via a shortest path. The analysis of the PoA in the uniform model boils down to the analysis of the Greedy Algorithm for the OSTP, where the worst-case order is considered. The following example demonstrates that even this special class of ordered protocols, becomes very rich once the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric space. Uniform protocols throw away this crucial component, the structure of the underlying metric, that universal protocols can use in their favor to come up with better PoA guarantees.
Uniform protocols. The designer chooses an order of the players 1, . . . , k without prior knowledge of the graph. The adversary constructs a worst-case graph, by simulating the adversary for the Greedy Algorithm of the OSTP [33] , and places the players accordingly (see for example Figure 1 (a),(b), the q vertices). Therefore the PoA of uniform ordered protocol is Ω(log k) [20] .
Universal protocols. The design is taking into account the graph; consider the worst-case graph for the Greedy Algorithm of the OSTP (illustrated in Figure 1 (a),(b) for a small number of players). For the graph of Figure 1 (a), choose the linear order dictated from the path p 1 , . . . , p 9 (say from left to right). For the graph of Figure 1 (b) order the vertices according to their distance from t, p 1 , . . . , p 11 . The adversary will choose k and the positions of the players (s 1 , . . . , s k ). In both cases, it is not hard to see that, no matter which subset of players the adversary chooses, the PoA remains constant as k grows.
Example 2. (Generalized weighted Shapley).
In [20] , it was shown that ordered protocols are essentially optimal among uniform protocols. In our model, the choice of the optimal method may depend on the underlying graph metric. Take the example in Figure 1 (c). By using Shapley cost sharing the adversary can choose v 1 , v 2 , v 3 and in the Nash equilibrium v 1 , v 3 connect directly to t and v 2 connects through v 1 . Regarding any ordered protocol, the square defined by the v i 's contains a path of length 2 where the middle vertex comes last in the order. The adversary will select this triplet of players, say v 1 , v 2 , v 3 . In the Nash equilibrium, v 1 connects directly to t, v 3 and v 2 connect through v 1 . In both cases, the cost of the Nash equilibria is 5 and the minimum Steiner tree that connects those vertices with t has cost 4 (by ignoring ε) and therefore, PoA ≥ 5/4. However the following (generalized Shapley) protocol, has P oA = 1. Partition the players into two sets S 1 = {v 1 , v 2 }, S 2 = {v 3 , v 4 }. If players from both partitions appear on some edge, then the cost is charged only to players from S 1 . Players that belong to the same partition share the cost equally. One can verify that for all possible subsets of players this protocol produces only optimal equilibria.
Results. We propose a model for the design of (universal) network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria, in situations where the designer has incomplete information about the input. The designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric but the subset of the requested players is not known and will appear in an adversarial manner. The central question we address is: to what extent does prior knowledge of the metric help in good network design under uncertainty?
We first demonstrate that there exist classes of graph metrics where prior knowledge of the underlying metric can dramatically improve the performance of good network cost-sharing design. For outerplanar graph metrics, we provide a universal ordered cost-sharing protocol with constant PoA, against any choice of the adversary. This is in contrast to uniform protocols that ignore the graph and cannot achieve PoA better than Ω(log k) in outerplanar metrics.
Our main technical result shows that there exist graph metrics, for which knowing the underlying metric does not help the designer, and any universal protocol has PoA of Ω(log k). This matches the upper bound of O(log k) that can be achieved without prior knowledge of the metric [33, 20] .
Open Question: For which metric spaces can one design universal protocols with constant PoA?
Techniques. We prove our main theorem in two stages. In the first stage (Section 3) we bound the PoA achieved by any ordered protocol. Our origin is a well-known particular "bad" ordered structure that was used to show a lower bound on the Greedy Algorithm of the OSTP (like the labeled path (q 1 , q 6 , q 4 , . . . , q 2 ) in Figure 1 (a)). The challenge is to show that high dimensional hypercubes exhibit such a distance preserving structure no matter how the vertices are ordered. The whole Section 3 is devoted to this and we believe that it is of independent interest.
We show the existence proof by employing powerful tools from Extremal Combinatorics and in particular Ramsey Theory [31] . We first prove a seemingly unrelated Ramsey-type result. We are inspired by a Ramsey-type result due to Alon et al. [4] , in which they show that for any given length ≥ 5, any edge coloring of a high dimensional hypercube contains a monochromatic cycle of length 2 . We show a similar Ramsey-type result but for a different carefully constructed structure; we assert that every 2-edge coloring of high dimensional hypercubes Q n contains a monochromatic copy of that structure. Then, we prescribe a special 2-edge-coloring, so that, for any ordering of the vertices of Q n , the order for that subgraph preserves some nice properties. We refer the reader to the beginning of Section 3 for an intuition. An appropriate subset of the subgraph's vertices can be 1-embedded into a hypercube of lower dimension. By recursive application of the above, we show existence of the desired distance preserving structure.
In the second stage (Section 4) we extend the lower bound to all universal cost-sharing protocols, by using the characterization of [20] . In high level, we use as basis the construction for the ordered protocol and create "multiple copies" 2 . The adversary will choose different subsets of players, depending on whether the designer chose protocols "close" to Shapley or to ordered. In the latter case, we use arguments from Matching Theory to guarantee existence of ordered-like players in one of the hypercubes.
Related Work Following the work of [5, 6] , a long line of research studies network cost-sharing games, mainly focusing on the PoS of the Shapley cost-sharing mechanism. [5] showed a tight Θ(log k) bound for directed networks, while for undirected networks several variants have been studied [13, 15, 19, 21, 26, 27, 39, 14] but the exact value of PoS still remains a big open problem. For multicast games, an improved upper bound of O(log k/ log log k) is known due to Li [39] , while for broadcast games, a series of work [27, 38] lead finally to a constant due to Bilò et al. [15] . The PoA of some special equilibria has been also studied in [17, 18] .
Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [20] initiated the study of network cost-sharing design with respect to PoA and PoS. They characterized a class of protocols that satisfy certain desired properties (which was later extended by Gopalakrishnan, Marden and Wierman, in [29] ), and they thoroughly studied PoA and PoS for several cases. Falkenhausen and Harks [43] studied parallel links and weighted players while Gkatzelis, Kollias and Roughgarden [28] , focus on weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions.
Close in spirit to universal cost-sharing protocols is the notion of Coordination Mechanisms [22] that provides a way to improve the PoA in cases of incomplete information. The designer has to decide in advance local scheduling policies or increases in edge latencies, without knowing the exact input, and has been used for scheduling problems [22, 34, 36, 8, 16, 24, 11, 1, 2] as well as for simple routing games [23, 12] .
As discussed in Example 1, the analysis of the equilibria induced by ordered protocols corresponds to the analysis of Greedy Algorithm for the MST. In the uniform model, this corresponds to the analysis of the Greedy Algorithm [33, 7] for the (Generalized) OSTP [3, 9] , which was recently shown to be Θ(log k)-competitive by Umboht [42] , even for the generalized version. The universal model is closely related to universal network design problems [35] , hence our choice for the term "universal". In the universal TSP, given a metric space, the algorithm designer has to decide a master order so that tours that use this order have good approximation [40, 10, 32, 30, 35 ].
Preliminaries
A multicast network is a connected undirected graph, with a designated root t, G = (V, E, t), where each edge e carries a nonnegative constant cost, c e . A multicast cost-sharing network game, or simply a network game, is specified by a multicast network, a set of players {1, . . . , k} and a costsharing protocol. Each player i is associated with a terminal s i , which she is willing to connect with t. A cost-sharing protocol decides the cost-shares of players for the edges that they use.
Cost-Sharing Protocol. For any set of players N , a cost-sharing method ξ : 2 N → R |N | + decides, for every subset of players S ⊆ N , the cost-shares of all players. We denote by ξ(i, S) the cost-share that the method ξ assigns to player i, for input S. A natural rule is that the shares for players not included in S should always be 0, i.e. if i / ∈ S, ξ(i, S) = 0. It is without loss of generality to assume that each player is associated with a distinct vertex. 3 For any graph G = (V, E, t), a cost-sharing [5, 20] and not the total number of vertices in the graph. protocol Ξ assigns, for every e ∈ E, some cost-sharing method ξ e on V .
(Pure) Nash Equilibrium (NE). We denote by P i the set of all strategies for player i, i.e. the set of all the paths connecting s i to t. Consider any outcome/strategy profile, P = (P 1 , . . . , P k ), where P i ∈ P i for all i ∈ [k], and let S e be the set of players using edge e ∈ E under P. Let c i (P) = e∈P i ξ e (i, S e ) be the total cost-share that methods ξ e assign to player i under P. Players' objective is to minimize their cost-shares, c i (P). A strategy profile P = (P 1 , . . . , P k ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every player i ∈ [k] and every strategy P i ∈ P i ,
where (P −i , P i ) denotes the strategy profile that all players but i choose their strategy according to P and player i chooses strategy P i , i.e. player i unilaterally changes her strategy from P i to P i .
Price of Anarchy (PoA). The cost of an outcome P = (P 1 , . . . , P k ) is defined as c(P) = e∈∪ i P i c e . The outcome Ø = (O 1 , . . . , O k ) = arg min P c(P), denotes the optimum solution, which corresponds to the minimum Steiner tree with {t, s 1 , . . . , s k } as the requested vertices. Given a network cost-sharing game, with graph G, set of players S and protocol Ξ, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as P oA(G, S, Ξ) = max P∈ N c(P)/c(Ø), where N is the set of all NE of the game induced by Ξ and S on G.
We model incomplete information in a Competitive Analysis manner. For any graph G = (V, E), some protocol Ξ is defined for the set V . Then an adversary will select a subset S ⊆ V of players' requests to connect with t. Under this perspective, we define the PoA for two different cases, a) given Ξ and G and b) given Ξ and some class of metrics G, respectivelly as follows:
The PoA of any protocol, for some class of metrics G, is defined in our model as
The definition of PoA(G) implies that for each graph G ∈ G, the best Ξ is considered, i.e. the one that minimizes the largest ratio between the optimum solution and any NE regarding any possible subset of players.
Universal Cost-Sharing Protocols. Following previous work [20, 43] , we focus our attention to cost-sharing protocols that satisfy the following natural properties: -Budget-balance: For every network game induced by the cost sharing protocol Ξ, and every outcome of it, i∈S ξ e (i, S) = c e , for every edge e with cost c e .
-Separability: For every network game induced by the cost sharing protocol, the cost shares of each edge are completely determined by the set of players using it.
-Stability: In every network game induced by the cost-sharing protocol, there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium, regardless of the graph structure.
Even if the network evolves over time, we require that the protocol always guarantees a NE. Due to the characterization in [20] , we restrict ourselves to the family of generalized weighted Shapley protocols. We call any cost-sharing protocol Ξ universal, if it satisfies these three properties and the cost-sharing method ξ e that it assigns to any edge e of a graph G is a function only of G.
Generalized Weighted Shapley Protocol (GWSP). Since we assume constant costs at the edges, the Shapley and weighted Shapley cost-sharing protocols are equivalent to the fair and proportional cost-sharing protocols, respectively. For any edge e of cost c e and players' weights/parameters {w 1 , . . . , w n }, the following cost-sharing methods are applied by the two protocols:
The generalized weighted Shapley protocol (GWSP) generalizes the weighted Shapley protocol, by adding an extra parameter Σ = (U 1 , . . . , U h ), where Σ is an ordered partition of the players. An interpretation of Σ is that for i < j, players from U i "arrives" before players from U j . More formally, for every edge e of cost c e , every set of players S e that use e and for s = arg min j {U j |U j ∩ S e = ∅}, the GWSP assigns the proportional method regarding only players of U s ∩ S e :
In the special case that each U i contains exactly one player, the protocol is called ordered. The order of the U i sets indicates a permutation of the players, denoted by π.
Graph Theory. For every graph G, we denote by V (G) and E(G) the set of vertices and edges of G, respectively. For any v, u ∈ V (G), (v, u) denotes an edge between v and u and d G (v, u) denotes the shortest distance between v and u in G; if G is clear from the context, we simply write
Lower Bound of Ordered Protocols
The main result of this section shows that for any order of the vertices of high dimensional hypercubes, there always exists a distance preserving path, such that the order of its vertices follows the pattern of the lower bounds for the Greedy Algorithm of the OSTP (see Example 1(a) and Fig. 3 ). Definition 4 defines formally this structure.
The proof proceeds in several steps. In Section 3.1 we define a special subgraph G m of a hypercube. Section 3.2 is devoted to show that every 2-edge coloring of a (suitably) high dimensional hypercube contains a monochromatic copy of G m (Lemma 6). Then, in Section 3.3 we show that, for any ordering of the vertices of Q n , we can define a special 2-edge-coloring, so that the vertices' order (label) of G m satisfies some nice properties (Lemma 8). Based on the color of G m , we appropriately choose a subset of its vertices, which can be 1-embedded into a hypercube of lower dimension. At last, in Section 3.4, by a recursive application of the combination of the Ramsey-type result and the coloring, we prove the existence of the above path in high dimensional hypercubes (Theorem 9). We then show how to construct a graph that serves as lower bound for all ordered protocols similar to the example in Figure1(a) (Theorem 11).
Definition 3. Given a path graph P = (v 0 , . . . , v 2 r ) on 2 r + 1 vertices, we define a partition of the vertices into r + 1 classes, D 0 (P ), D 1 (P ), . . . , D r (P ), as follows: Class 0 contains the endpoints of the path, D 0 (P ) = {v 0 , v 2 r }. Given that r > 0, for every j ∈ [r], D j = {v i : i mod 2 r−j = 0 and i mod 2 r−j+1 = 0}. For v ∈ D j , w ∈ D j and j < j , we say that v belongs to a higher class than w.
For example, for the path
Note that always |D 0 (P )| = 2 and for j = 0, |D j (P )| = 2 j−1 .
Definition 4. We call a path graph P = (v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v 2 r ), with distinct integer labels π, bad, and we denote it by P r (π), if the following property holds. For any j > 0 and v i ∈ D j , we define Π(v i ) to be the parents of v i (closest vertices belonging to higher classes) defined as Π(
An example of such a path for r = 3 is shown in Fig. 3 . We give some remarks derived from Definitions 3 and 4: for all v / ∈ {v 0 , v 2 r } i) the cardinality of Π(v) is 2, ii) the vertices of Π(v) belong to higher classes than v, iii) all vertices between v and any vertex of Π(v) belong to lower classes than v. Our main result of this section is that there exist graphs, high dimensional hypercubes, such that for any order π, P r (π) always appears as a distance preserving subgraph.
Our proof is existential and uses Ramsey theory. In order to give some high level intuition, we will first use Ramsey-type result due to Alon et al. [4] to show that, for any π, P 2 (π) appears as a subgraph. In [4] Alon et al. showed that for any given length ≥ 5, any edge coloring of a high dimensional hypercube contains a monochromatic cycle of length 2 . Consider the hypercube of [4] for l = 5 as a bipartite graph G = (A, B, E). For any edge (v, u), with v ∈ A and u ∈ B, if π(v) < π(u), we paint the edge blue, otherwise we paint it red. Without loss of generality, assume that the monochromatic cycle C 10 of length 10 is blue. Then, for any v ∈ A ∩ V (C 10 ), its neighbors in C 10 follow v in π, see also Figure 3 . The vertices of A ∩ V (C 10 ) can be 1-embedded into a cycle C 5 of length 5; the cycle C 5 in Figure 3 is the (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 1). We appropriately choose three consecutive vertices of C 5 , such that the middle one follows the others in π. The existence of such triplet is guaranteed because C 5 is a cycle and it is the (5, 8, 1) in Figure 3 . These three vertices with their intermediate ones in C 10 form a path isomorphic to P 2 (π); that path in Figure 3 is the (5, 10, 8, 9, 1) . Figure 3 : An example of the monochromatic labeled cycle C10 derived by [4] . The vertices with continuous and dashed lines correspond to the sets A ∩ V (C10) and B ∩ V (C10), respectively. (5, 10, 8, 9, 1) is a "bad" ordered path.
There are two limitations in using the results of [4] in our proof. a) The induced monochromatic cycle of any length can only be used in order to prove the existence of a "bad" ordered path of length 4 and it doesn't help apply for paths of higher lengths as required for our lower bound. b) The induced "bad" ordered path is not necessarily distance-preserving, since the monochromatic cycle derived by [4] is not distance preserving. This fact may have unwanted impact while analyzing the NE. Therefore, in order to overcome those limits, we prove a similar Ramsey-type result, but for a different monochromatic subgraph with some special properties (to be described in Section 3.1). We next give some notation regarding hypercubes. Let Q n be the graph of the n-dimensional hypercube whose vertex set is {0, 1} n . We represent a vertex v of V (Q n ) by an n-bit string
1}. An edge is defined between vertices that differ only in one bit. We call this bit, flip-bit, and we denote it by ' * '. For example, x = [11100], y = [11000] are two vertices of Q 5 and (x, y) = [11 * 00] is the edge that connects them. The distance between two vertices x, y is defined by their Hamming distance, d(v, u) = |{j : x j = y j }|. By [xy] or xy we denote the concatenation of an n-bit string x with an m-bit string y, i.e. xy = [
is the concatenation of the n bits of x. We define the level of a vertex x by w(x) = n i=1 x i . We denote by L i the set of vertices of level i ∈ [n]. We define the prefix sum of an edge e = (x, y), where the flip-bit is in the j-th coordinate, by p(e) = j−1 i=1 x i . Let π be an ordering of V (Q n ) with labels 1, . . . , 2 n . Each label is a unique positive integer. The labels correspond to the order of the vertices in the ordered protocol, from smaller to larger.
For a fixed subset of coordinates S ⊆ [n], we extend the definition of the distance as follows,
otherwise.
Description of G m
In the following, we denote by [l, k] the set of integers {l, l + 1, . . . , k − 1, k}. For the case that l = 1, we simply write [k] . For a positive integer m, we define a graph [10] }, the subsets V 1 , V 2 , V 3 are defined as follows:
For example, for m = 2, [01 10 00 10] ∈ V 1 (2), [01 10 10 10] ∈ V 2 (2), [01 11 10 00] ∈ V 3 (2). V 1 contains 2m − 1 concatenations of pairs [01] and [10] and only one pair [00] that is found in the second half of the string. V 2 contains only 2m concatenations of [01] and [10] . V 3 contains 2m − 2 concatenations of [01] and [10] and moreover one pair [11] that lies on the first half of the string, and one pair [00] that lies on the second half of the string. Observe that G m is bipartite with vertex partitions V 1 and V 2 ∪ V 3 , as vertices of V 1 belong to level 2m − 1, while vertices of V 2 ∪ V 3 to level 2m. 
Ramsey-type Theorem
This section asserts that there exists n such that, for any 2-edge-coloring of a hypercube Q n , it contains a monochromatic copy of G m . 4 It remains to show that the graph, with the edges defined by those prefix sums, contains a monochromatic copy of G m . This can be obtained from E m (the set of edges of G m ), by inserting blocks of 1's of suitable length among the bits of the edges of E m . Let 1 r denote a string of r 1's and define β i = 1 p i −p i−1 −1 for i ∈ [2m − 1], β 0 = 1 p 0 and β 2m = 1 4m−1−p 2m−1 . For any edge e = [a j b j ] j ∈ E m , insert β 0 at the beginning of the string, for j ∈ [m] insert β j between a j and b j and for j ∈ [m + 1, 2m] insert the string β j after b j .
Recall that each edge of E m contains exactly 2m zero bits. Notice that
Therefore, in total we have 6m coordinates (same as the size of T ) and 4m non-zero bits (same as the size of S). These are precisely the coordinates of T . The rest n − 6m of the coordinates are filled with zeros.
It remains to show that for such edges the prefix of the flip-bit is always one of the p 0 , . . . , p 2m−1 . This would imply that all these edges are monochromatic. Furthermore, all but 4m coordinates are fixed and the 4m coordinates form exactly the sets V 1 (m), V 2 (m), V 3 (m); therefore, the monochromatic subgraph is a copy of G m .
For any edge e = [a j b j ] j ∈ E m , we consider the possible positions of the flip-bit at
• a j for j ∈ [m]. Its prefix is j−1 i=0 β i + (j − 1) = p j−1 , where the term j − 1 corresponds to the number of pairs [a s b s ] with s < j, each of which contributes in the prefix with a single 1.
• b j for j ∈ [m]. Since j ≤ m, a j = 1. Then the prefix equals to j i=0 β i + (j − 1) + 1 = p j .
• a j or b j for j ∈ [m + 1, 2m]. For such j, (a j , b j ) ∈ {(0 * ), ( * 0)} and all other pairs belong to A. Therefore, the prefix is equal to j−1 i=0 β i + (j − 1) = p j−1 .
Coloring based on the labels
This part of the proof shows that no matter how the vertices of a hypercube Q n are ordered, there is a 2-edge coloring with the following property: in the monochromatic G m , either each of the V 1 vertices or each of the V 2 vertices has neighbors in G m with only higher label. This implies a desired labeling property for some subgraph of Q n , the structure of which is defined next.
Definition 7. We define Q s n to be a subdivision of Q n , by replacing each edge by a path of length s. In other words, for each edge of the Q n we introduce s − 1 new vertices that are placed in this edge and, along with the end vertices of the edge, form a path of length s. Q 1 n is simply Q n . We denote by Z(Q s n ) the set of all pairs q = (x, x ), where (x, x ) is an edge of Q n . P (q) = P (x, x ) is the corresponding path in Q s n . For every q = (x, x ) ∈ Z(Q 2 m ), we denote by θ(q) = θ(x, x ) the middle vertex of P (q). In the next lemma, we choose an appropriate 2-edge coloring of Q n so that there exists a subgraph isomorphic to Q 2 m , such that for every q ∈ Z(Q 2 m ), θ(q) has greater label than both its neighbors.
Lemma 8. For any positive integer m, for all n ≥ n 0 = g(m) and for any ordering π of V (Q n ), there exists a subgraph W of Q n that is isomorphic to Q 2 m , such that for every q = (x, x ) ∈ V (W ) it holds that π(θ(q)) > π(x) and π(θ(q)) > π(x ).
Proof. Choose a sufficiently large n ≥ n 0 = g(m) as in Lemma 6. Partition the vertices of Q n into sets O, E of vertices of odd and even level, respectively. For every edge e = (z, z ) such that z ∈ O and z ∈ E, if π(z) < π(z ), then paint e blue. Otherwise paint it red. Therefore, for every blue edge, the endpoint in O has smaller label than the endpoint in E. The opposite holds for any red edge.
Lemma 6 implies that Q n contains a monochromatic copy (blue or red) of G m . Recall that G m is bipartite between vertices of levels L 4m−1 and L 4m and that
be the subset of the 4m coordinates that correspond to vertices of V m . Also let S 1 and S 2 be the first 2m and the last 2m coordinates of S, respectively. As a next step we show how the monochromatic G m helps us to construct Q 2 m that satisfies the required labeling. First assume that G m is blue. From the way we colored the edges, it follows that for every edge e = (z, z ) ∈ E m with z ∈ V 1 , z ∈ V 2 ∪ V 3 it holds that π(z) < π(z ). Fix a 2m-bit string s that corresponds to a permissible bit assignment to the S 2 coordinates of some vertex in V 1 (see Section 3.1). Define W s as the subset of vertices of V 1 where the S 2 coordinates are set to s. Recall that each of the first m pairs [a j b j ], j ∈ [m], of a vertex z ∈ W s , may take any of the two bit assignments [01] and [10] . Hence, |W s | = 2 m . Note that we can embed W s into Q m with distortion 1 and scaling factor 1/2, by mapping the first m pairs of bits into single bits; map [01] to 0 and [10] to 1. Every two vertices with distance d in Q m , has distance 2d in Q n . For every x, x ∈ W s ⊂ V 1 with d(x, x ) = 2, Lemma 5 implies that there exists y = θ(x, x ) ∈ V 3 , such that d(x, y) = d(x , y) = 1. Therefore, π(y) > π(x) and π(y) > π(x ). Take the union Y = ∪ y of all such vertices y, then W s ∪ Y induces a subgraph W isomorphic to Q 2 m , that fulfills the labeling requirements. In the case that G m is red, we can similarly prove that there exists a subgraph isomorphic to Q 2 m with the desired labels. We concentrate only on vertices V 2 . Fix now a 2m-bit string s that corresponds to a permissible bit assignment of the S 1 coordinates of a vertex in V 2 . Define W s as the subset of vertices of V 2 where the the S 1 coordinates are set to s. Similarly, we can embed W s into Q m with distortion 1 and scaling factor 1/2.
For every x, x ∈ W s ⊂ V 2 with d(x, x ) = 2, where the S 1 coordinates are fixed to s, Lemma 5 implies that there exists y = θ(x, x ) ∈ V 1 , such that d(x, y) = d(x , y) = 1. Therefore, π(y) > π(x) and π(y) > π(x ). Take the union Y = ∪ y of all such vertices y, then W s ∪ Y induces a subgraph W isomorphic to Q 2 m , that fulfills the labeling requirements.
Lower Bound Construction
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section. We first prove that there exists a high dimensional hypercube with a distance preserving path P r (π), for any order of its vertices, π.
Theorem 9. For every positive integer r, and for sufficiently large n ≥ n(r), there exits a graph Q n such that every ordering π of its vertices, it contains a 'bad' distance preserving path P r (π).
Proof. Let g be a function as in Lemma 6. We recursively define the sequence n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n r , such that n r = 1 and n i−1 = g(n i ), for i ∈ [r]. For every r, n 0 is uniquely defined and we denote it by n(r). We will prove that Q n 0 is the required graph.
Claim 10. For every i ∈ [0, r], and for any vertex ordering π of Q n 0 , it contains a subgraph isomorphic to Q s i n i , with s i = 2 i , such that for every q ∈ Z(Q s i n i ), P (q) is a path isomorphic to P i (π).
Proof of Claim. The proof is by induction on i. As a base case, Q s 0 n 0 = Q 1 n 0 = Q n 0 is the graph itself. An edge is trivially a path P 0 (π), for any π. Assume now that Q n 0 contains a subgraph isomorphic to Q s i n i , for some i < r, such that for every q ∈ Z(Q s i n i ), P (q) is a path P i (π). It is sufficient to prove that Q s i n i contains a subgraph isomorphic to Q s i+1 n i+1 , such that for every q ∈ Z(Q s i+1 n i+1 ), P (q) is a path P i+1 (π).
For every (x, x ) ∈ Z(Q s i n i ), if we replace P (x, x ) with a direct edge e = (x, x ), the resulting graph is a copy of Q n i . Applying Lemma 8 on Q n i , guarantees the existence of a subgraph W isomorphic to Q 2 n i+1 (n i = g(n i+1 )), where for every (y, y ) ∈ Z(W ), π(θ(y, y )) ≥ π(y) and π(θ(y, y )) ≥ π(y ). Each of the edges (y, θ(y, y )) and (y , θ(y, y )) of Q 2 n i+1 are replaced by a path P i (π) in Q s i n i . Therefore, W is a copy of Q s i+1 n i+1 , with P (y, y ) being a path P i+1 (π).
Recall that n r = 1 and therefore Q sr nr is a path graph P = (v 0 , . . . , v 2 r ) of length 2 r . We further need to show that P is a distance preserving subgraph of Q n 0 . This can by verified by decomposing the coding mapping that we make at each iteration. At Lemma 8 we mapped [01] to 0 and [10] to 1. By going backward, we map 0 to [01] and 1 to [10] .
After the j th iteration, we derive a set of vertices W j (W s of Lemma 8) that can be 1-embedded into Q n j ; let P j = W j ∩ V (P ) = {v i : i mod 2 j = 0}. We used n j bits to encode the vertices in W j ; let d j denotes the hamming distance of that encoding.
We will show by induction, that for every j ∈ [0, r], d j (v i , v i ) = |i − i |/2 j , for all v i , v i ∈ P j . As a base case assume j = r, where P r = {v 0 , v 2 r } encoding as 0 and 1, with hamming distance 1 = |2 r − 0|/2 r . Assume now that for some j > 0,
For every v i , v i ∈ P j , by mapping 0 → [01] and 1 →
For the rest of the cases we use the following observation: consider any two vertices u, w ∈ P j such that d j (u, w) = 1; at the end of iteration j − 1, u and w have a common and unique neighbor v ∈ P j−1 \ P j . This implies that d j−1 (v, u) = d j−1 (v, w) = 1. The uniqueness further implies that every v ∈ P j−1 \ P j has two neighbors u, w ∈ P j .
Consider now any v i , v i ∈ P j−1 \ P j and w.l.o.g. assume i < i . The neighbors of v i and v i are v i−2 j−1 , v i+2 j−1 and v i −2 j−1 , v i +2 j−1 , respectively. Note that i + 2 j−1 ≤ i − 2 j−1 and therefore,
For the sake of contradiction, assume that
The lemma follows because for every
Finally we extend Q n so that for any order π of its vertices, a path P r (π) exists along with the shortcuts as shown in the example in Figure 1(a) .
Theorem 11. Any ordered universal cost-sharing protocol on undirected graphs admits a PoA of Ω(log k), where k is the number of players that appear to connect with t.
Proof. Let k = 2 r + 1 for some positive integer r. From Theorem 9, we know that for any vertex ordering π of Q n(r) there is a distance preserving path P r (π).
Starting from Q n(r) , we construct the weighted graphQ n(r) with vertex set V (Q n(r) ) = Q n(r) ∪ {t}, where t is the designated root. We connect all pairs x, y with direct edges, with costs c e = 2 k , if t is one of its endpoint, otherwise its cost is c e = d Q n(r) (x, y) (similar to Figure 1(a) ).
The adversary selects the vertices of P r (π) to appear, and the lower bound follows, by players choosing the direct edges to connect with their parents (see Definition 4, for the term "parent") in the NE. . Each f induces a positive (always assigns strictly positive cost shares) and linear (for any edge e, if ξ e is the method for unit cost, c e · ξ e is the method for cost c e ) potential-based protocol. The family of potential-based protocols is equivalent to the weighted Shapley protocols, where the weight w i corresponds to some 1/f (i). The concatenation of two potential-based protocols for disjoint player sets defines an order among these two sets. The GWSPs are concatenations of the potential-based protocols.
Let Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 be linear, not necessarily positive, cost-sharing protocols for disjoint player sets U 1 and U 2 , respectively. The concatenation of Ξ 1 and Ξ 2 is the cost sharing protocol Ξ = Ξ 1 ⊕ Ξ 2 of player set U 1 ∪ U 2 , defined by
Lemma 12. (Lemma 4.10 of [20] ). Let f be an edge potential for players N and ξ be the costsharing method induced by f , for unit cost. For some k ≥ 1 and a constant α, with 1 ≤ α 2k ≤ 1 + k −3 , let S ⊆ N be a subset of players with f (i) ≤ αf (j), for every i, j ∈ S. If |S| ≤ k, then for any i, j ∈ S, ξ(i, S) ≤ α(ξ(j, S) + 2k −2 ).
Lemma 13. (Lemma 4.11 of [20] ). Let f be an edge potential for players N , and ξ be the costsharing method induced by f , for unit cost. For any two players i, j ∈ N , such that f (i) ≥ βf (j): ξ(i, {i, j}) ≥ β/(β + 1) and for every S ⊇ {i, j}, ξ(j, S) ≤ 1/(β + 1).
Lower Bound
In this section, we exhibit metric spaces for which no universal cost-sharing protocol admits a PoA better than Ω(log k). Due to [20] , we can restrict ourselves in generalized weighted Shapley protocols. The following two Lemmas will be used in our main theorem.
Lemma 14. Let X be a finite set of size nsr 2 , and V 1 , . . . , V n be a partition of X, with |V i | = sr 2 , for all i ∈ [n]. Then, for any coloring χ of X such that no more than r elements have the same color, there exists a rainbow subset S ⊂ V (i.e. χ(v) = χ(u) for all v, u ∈ S), with |S ∩ V i | = s for every i ∈ [n].
Proof. The proof uses Hall's Theorem. Given the partition V 1 , . . . , V n of X and the coloring χ, we construct a bipartite graph G = (A, B, E) . A is the set of colors used in χ. For every V i we create a set B i of size s. Then B = ∪B i . If the color j is used in V i , then we add an edge (j, i ) for all i ∈ B i in the bipartite graph. Since no more than r elements of X have the same color, each color j appears in at most r distinct V i sets, and since for each V i there are s vertices (B i ), the degree of a vertex in A is at most r · s. On the other hand, each V i has size r 2 · s and since at most r elements may have the same color, each V i has at least r · s different colors. Therefore, the degree of each vertex of B is at least r · s.
Let T ⊆ B, and let E(T ) be the set of edges with at least one endpoint in T . Observe that E(T ) ⊆ E(N (T )), where N (T ) denotes the set of neighbors of T . By using the degree bounds for the vertices in B, |E(T )| ≥ r · s · |T | and by using the degree bound for the vertices in A, |E(N (T ))| ≤ r · s · |N (T )|. Therefore, |T | ≤ |N (T )|. By Hall's Theorem there exists a matching which covers every vertex in B.
Each vertex in B i is matched with a distinct color, therefore (since |B i | = s) in each V i there exists a subset with at least s elements with distinct colors, let W i be such a subet with exactly s elements. In addition the colors in different W i subsets are distinct. Then, S = ∪W i . Lemma 15. Let P = P 1 , . . . , P n be a partition of [n 2 ], with |P i | = n for i ∈ [n]. Then, there exists a subset S ⊂ [n 2 ] with exactly one element from each subset P i , such no two distinct x, y ∈ S are consecutive, i.e. for every x, y ∈ S, |x − y| ≥ 2.
Proof. Let n be a positive integer and P i = {x i1 , . . . , x in }. W.l.o.g we can assume that x ij 's are in increasing order w.r.t j and in addition that P i 's are sorted such that x ii < x ji , for all j > i (otherwise rename the elements recursively to fulfill the requirement). Then, it is not hard to see that S = {x kk |k ∈ [n]} can serve as the required set.
Next we prove our main Theorem. We distinguish between two cases: either there exists a large enough set of potential players A with f -values close to Shapley values, or there exists a large enough set of potential players B with f -values close to ordered ones. In [20] they made a similar separation, by constructing a graph based on which of the two sets exists. However, in our problem, the graph should be decided before the protocol. Therefore, showing the existence of either A or B is not enough. We should construct a graph, that for either existence of A or B, there exists a subset of players resulting in high PoA.
The high level idea is that we construct a high dimensional hypercube with sufficiently large number of potential players at each vertex (by adding extra vertices, via zero-cost edges). Moreover, we add shortcuts among the vertices of appropriate costs and each vertex also connects with t via two parallel links of highly different costs (see Figure 5 ). If there exists a large enough set of potential players A with Shapley-like values in some vertex, then it is a NE that all of them follow the most costly link to t. Otherwise, we use Lemmas 14 and 15 to show that there exists a set of potential players B, with ordered-like values, one at each vertex of the hypercube. Then, by using the results of Section 3, there exists a path where the players are bad-ordered.
Theorem 16. There exist graph metrics, such that the PoA of any universal cost-sharing protocol is at least Ω(log k), where k is the number of requested vertices.
Proof. Let k = 2 r−1 + 1 be the number of requested players with r ≥ 4, (hence k ≥ 9). We use as a base to our lower bound construction, a hypercube Q n of high dimension n = n(r) that is computed by repeated applying r times the Ramsey-type in Lemma 6 (see also Theorem 9) .
For M = 16k 12 · 2 3n we construct the following network with N = M · 2 n vertices, plus the designated root t. We use as a base of our construction, a hypercube Q := Q n , with edge costs equal to 1. We add some direct edges/shortcuts as follows: for every two vertices v, u of distance 2 j , for j ∈ [r], we add an edge/shortcut, (v, u), with cost equal to c j = 2 j k−1 k j = Ω(2 j ). Moreover, for every vertex v q of Q, we create M − 1 new vertices, each of which we connect with v q via a zero-cost edge. Let V q be the set of these vertices (including v q ). Finally, we add a root t, which we connect with every vertex v q of Q, via two edges e q1 and e q2 , with costs 2k and 2k ·k/6, respectively. We denote this new network by Q * (see Figure 5 ). In the following we refer to the (potential) players by their terminal vertex. We will show that any GWSP for Q * , with cost-sharing method ξ, has PoA Ω(log k). GWSP can be described by concatenations of potential-based cost-sharing protocols Ξ 1 , . . . , Ξ h for a partition of the V (Q * ) into h subsets U 1 , . . . , U h , where Ξ j is induced from some edge potential f j .
Following the analysis of Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [20] , scale the f j 's such that for every i, j, f j (i) ≥ 1. For nonnegative integers s and α = 1 + k −3 1 2k , we form subgroups of vertices A js , for each U j , as follows A js = {i ∈ U j : f j (i) ∈ α s , α s+1 } (note that some of A js 's may be empty).
The adversary proceeds in two cases, depending on the intersection of the A js 's with the V q 's Shapley-like cost-sharing. Assume first there exist A js and V q such that |A is ∩ V q | ≥ k, and take a subset T ⊆ A is ∩ V q with exactly k vertices/players. Budget-balance implies that there exists a player i * ∈ T that will be charged ξ(i * , T ) ≤ 1/k proportion of the cost. On the other hand, Lemma 12 implies that for all i ∈ T , it is ξ(i, T ) ≤ α(1/k + 2k −2 ) ≤ 2 · (3/k) = 6/k.
The adversary will request precisely the set T . Note that a NE is formed if all players follow the edge e q2 , with cost 2k · k/6. No player's share is more than 2k in the NE and any alternative path would cost at least 2k. However, the optimum solution for the requested set T ∪ t is to follow the parallel link e q1 of cost 2k. Therefore, the PoA is Ω(k) for the first case. Ordered-like cost-sharing. If there is no such set T with at least k vertices, then each A js has size of at most k · 2 n . To see this, note that T refers to intersections A js with some V q 's. The V q 's form a partition of the set N and there are 2 n such sets. Therefore, |A js ∩ V q | ≤ k for all q, implies |A js | ≤ k · 2 n .
For every j ∈ [h], group consecutive sets A js (starting from A j0 ) into sets B jl , such that each B jl , (except perhaps from the last one), contains exactly 4k 5 nonempty A js 's. For every j ∈ [h], the last B jl contains at most 4k 5 nonempty A js sets. Consider the lexicographic order among B jl 's, i.e. B jl < B j l if j < j or if j = j and l < l . Rename these sets based on their total order as B i 's. The size of each B i is at most 4k 6 · 2 n .
Note now that α 4k 5 ≥ 8k +1. Therefore, for any pair of vertices p, g, that belong to different and non-consecutive sets B i 's, either p and g come from different U j 's or their f j (p) and f j (g) values differ by a factor at least 8k +1 (since there exist at least 4k 5 number of nonempty sets A js between the A js 's that p and g belong to). Now we apply Lemma 14 on the set N , for r = 4k 6 ·2 n and s = 2 n , by considering the subsets V q as the partition of N . As a coloring scheme, we color all the vertices of each B i with the same color and use different colors among the sets B i . To verify the correctness, recall that |V q | = M = r 2 · s and |B i | ≤ r. Lemma 14 guarantees that for each V q there exists V q ⊂ V q of size 2 n , such that every v ∈ V = ∪ q V q belongs to a distinct B i .
Next, we order the vertices of V according to the order of the B i 's that they belong to. Since the V q 's form a partition of V , Lemma 15 guarantees the existence of a subset C ⊂ V , such that C contains exactly one vertex from each V q and there are no consecutive (according to the ordering we assumed for V ) vertices in C. This means that C contains exactly one vertex from each set V q and all these vertices belong to different and non-consecutive sets B i .
To summarize, so far we know that a) for every pair of vertices p, g ∈ C, either p and h come from different U j 's or their f j (p) and f j (g) values differ by a factor at least 8k + 1, b) C is a copy of Q n (by ignoring zero-cost edges). The vertices of C are ordered according to the B i 's they belong to.
If we use this order π of C, Theorem 9 guarantees that there always exists at least one distance preserving path P r (π) (we refer the reader to Definition 4 for this kind of paths). Let S be the vertices of P r (π) excluding the last class D r (see Definition 3). The adversary will request this set S (|S| = k) to connect with t. It remains to show that there exists a NE, the cost of which is a factor of Ω(log k) away from optimum. We will refer to these vertices as S = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k }, based on their order in the path P r (π). Without loss of generality, assume that v 1 precedes v k in π.
Consider the following set of strategies P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ). Player v 1 directly connects to t via e 11 , i.e. P 1 = e 11 . Player v k selects the path P k that goes to t via v 1 (using the shortcut (v 1 , v k )) and then follows P 1 . As for the rest, player v i / ∈ {v 1 , v k } selects the path P i that connects via a shortcut with one of his parents in the class hierarchy (some vertex from Π(v i ), see Definition 4) and then follows that player to t.
Recall that for any j > 0, v i ∈ D j and w ∈ Π(v i ), d Q (v i , w) = 2 r−j and |D j | = 2 j−1 . Therefore, P has cost
However, there is a solution where everybody follows the path P r (π) and e 11 , which have cost of O(2 r ). Therefore, the PoA is Ω(r) = Ω(log k). It remains to show that P is a NE.
Claim 17. P is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Claim. The proof follows by combining the facts below.
• By Lemma 13, we know that for any subset T ⊆ S of players using an edge e of cost c e , if g ∈ T has the smallest label (i.e. g = arg min j {π(j)|j ∈ T }), then g's share is at least 8k−1 8k c e . This is because the total shares of players T \ {g} is upper bounded by c e
• For any player v i , the total cost of P i in the NE, is at most 8k. This is true because in the NE the first edge, that each player p uses, is a shortcut to reach one of her parents, with cost 2 r−j (see Definition 4) . Therefore, the cost of the total path to reach t is at most 2k + r−1 l=0 2 r−l < 8k (recall that k = 2 r−1 + 1).
• The share of player v i in the edges of P i at which she is not the first in π is at most 1 8k · 8k < 1.
• No player v i = v 1 has an incentive to choose an alternative path to replace her first edge in P i . Consider any player v i ∈ D j , 0 ≤ j < r. Any alternative path of her first edge contains edges with cost at least 2 r−j k−1 k r−j−1 , at which v i is first in π. So, her share should be at least a proportion of 8k−1 8k of that cost, therefore at least her cost-share for the shortcut in the NE, because c r−j ≤ 2 r−j 8k−1 8k k−1 k r−j−1 .
• Player v 1 's share in P 1 is at most 2k and any other path would incur cost of at least 2k.
• The share of player v k in the NE is at most 2 r + 1 = 2k − 1, whereas if she doesn't connect through v 1 , her share would be at least 2k.
• Finally, note that no player v i / ∈ {v 1 , v k } has an incentive to first connect with a different predecessor (not in her Π(v i )). Consider any player v i ∈ D j , 1 ≤ j < r. Under P, v i 's share is at most c r−j for her first edge/shortcut and at most 1 for the rest of her path. Furthermore, all vertices visited by players that precedes v i in π are connected by paths of cost at least c r−j (cost of 2 r−j in the hypercube) with each other. Therefore, any such deviation from the equilibrium would result to player v i being the first in π for a path of cost at least c r−j+1 . This implies a cost-share of at least 8k−1 8k c r−j+1 . However, for k ≥ 6 and j < r, 8k−1 8k c r−j+1 ≥ c r−j + 1.
Outerplanar
In this section we show that there exists a class of metrics, prior knowledge of which can dramatically improve the performance of good network cost-sharing design. For outerplanar graphs, we provide a universal cost-sharing protocol with constant PoA. In contrast, we stretch that uniform protocols cannot achieve PoA better than Ω(log k), because the lower bound for the greedy algorithm of the OSTP can be represented as an outerplanar graph (see Figure 6 (a) for an illustration). We next define an ordered cost-sharing protocol Ξ tour , with method ξ tour , and we show that it has constant PoA. We assume that the metric space is defined by a given biconnected outerplanar graph 5 . Every biconnected graph admits a unique Hamiltonian cycle [41] that can be found in linear time [25] . ξ tour orders the vertices according to the cyclic order in which they appear in the Hamiltonian tour starting from t and proceeding in a clockwise order π. In Figure 6 (a), π(q 8 ) < π(q 4 ) < π(q 9 ) < . . . . As a warm-up, we consider that the given graph is a cycle graph C = (V, E, t), which is a special outerplanar graph, and ξ tour follows the clockwise order of V in the cycle C, starting from t. We first bound the PoA of Ξ tour for that simple case, and then extend it to all outerplanar graphs.
Lemma 18. The PoA of Ξ tour in cycles is at most 2.
Proof. Consider a cycle graph C = (V, E, t) and let R ⊆ V be the set of the requested vertices (the terminals of players that want to connect with t). Let T * be the minimum Steiner tree (path) that connects R ∪ {t}, and a, b be its two endpoints. Note that minimality of T * implies a, b ∈ R ∪ {t}. Furthermore, a, b partition the cycle into two paths (T * , C \ T * ), and C \ T * contains no inner requested point. Moreover, t divides T * into two paths P 1 , P 2 . Let R 1 = {u 1 , . . . , u r = a} and R 2 = {w 1 , . . . , w s = b} be the requested vertices of P 1 and P 2 , respectively. W.l.o.g., π(u i ) < π(u i+1 ) and π(w j+1 ) < π(w j ), for all i, j.
Consider any NE, P = (P i ) i∈N . We bound the share of each player v = w s , by its distance from their immediate predecessor in π, as follows. For u 0 = t,
Also c ws (P) ≤ d(w s , t). Overall,
≤ c(P 1 ) + c(P 2 ) + c(P 2 ) ≤ 2c(T * ).
Theorem 19. The PoA of Ξ tour in outerplanar graphs is at most 12.
Proof. Based on the above discussion, it is sufficient to consider only biconnected outerplanar graphs with non-negative costs, including infinity. Let G = (V, E, t) be any such graph with R ⊆ V \ {t} the set of requested vertices; also R t = R ∪ {t}.
Let T * be the minimum Steiner tree that connects R ∪ {t}. Moreover, let C be the unique Hamiltonian tour of G and E = E \ E(C). The outer face of G forms C; hence, E is a set of non-crossing chords of C. If E * = E(T * ) ∩ E , then, C ∪ E * , forms |E * | + 1 = r chordless cycles C 1 , . . . , C r . Every pair C i , C j are either edge-disjoint or they have a single common edge belonging to E * . On the other hand, each edge of C belongs to exactly one C i and each edge of E * belongs to exactly two C i 's. Figure 6 (b) provides an illustration.
For every i ∈ [r], let R i = R t ∩ V (C i ) and t i be the vertex among R i that is first in π. W.l.o.g. assume that for all i ∈ [r − 1], π(t i ) ≤ π(t i+1 ) (then t 1 should be t). Moreover, let T * i be the subgraph of T * in C i . Note that T * i should be a path connecting R i . Consider any NE, P = (P i ) i∈N . We show separately that the shares of all R i \ {t i } are bounded by 4c(T * ) and the shares of all t i 's are bounded by 8c(T * ).
For the first case we use Lemma 18. For any cycle C i , by considering t i as the root, Lemma 18 provides a bound on the shares of R i \ {t i }. So, v∈R i \{t i } c v (P) ≤ 2c(T * i ). Recall, that each edge of E(T * ) belongs to at most two C i 's and hence to at most two T * i 's. Therefore, if we sum over all i ∈ [r], we obtain
The second case requires a bit more consideration. The endpoints of the edges of E * divide C into a partition of nonzero-length arcs, A 1 , . . . , A n , named based on their clockwise appearance in C, starting from an arc containing t. For every j ∈ [n], let a j and b j be the two endpoints of A j , and w.l.o.g. assume b j ≡ a j+1 .
The share of each t i can be bounded by its distance from t i−1 , for i > 1 (recall that t 1 = t). Assume that t i−1 and t i belong to A s and A s+s , respectively, for some s ≥ 1. Then c t i (P) ≤ d(t i , t i−1 ) ≤ d(t i , a s+s ) + d(b s , t i−1 ) + j∈ [1,s −1] d(a s+j , b s+j ).
(1)
Note that each arc A j belongs to exactly one C i and every C i contains at least one such arc (otherwise T * would have a cycle). For every i ∈ [r], let A i1 , ..., A in i be the arcs belonging to C i and a ij , b ij the end points of A ij . Recall that T * i is a path and every edge of E(C i ) ∩ E * belongs to T * i . Therefore, T * i contains entirely all but one A ij , say A im (see also Figure 6(b) ). This means that j∈[n i ],j =m d(a ij , b ij ) ≤ c(T * i ). Also a im and b im are points of path T * i , as endpoints of some edges of E * . Therefore, d(a ik , b ik ) ≤ c(T * i ). In total, j∈[n i ] d(a ij , b ij ) ≤ 2c(T * i ). Actually we can similarly show something more general:
For every j and α ij , β ij ∈ T * i ∩ A ij ,
By summing (1) over all t i 's (but t 1 ≡ t), each A j (or each A ij ) is associated with at most two terms of the sum. Therefore, by using also (2) , i∈ [2,r] c t i (P) ≤ 4
i∈[r]
c(T * i ) ≤ 8c(T * ).
In total c(P) = v∈R c v (P) ≤ 12c(T * ).
